Compliance and the power of authority  by Karakostas, Alexandros & Zizzo, Daniel John
CA
a
b
a
A
R
R
1
A
A
J
C
C
D
M
H
K
C
O
C
S
E
A
1
a
f
c
m
f
N
0
lJournal of Economic Behavior & Organization 124 (2016) 67–80
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Journal  of  Economic  Behavior  &  Organization
j ourna l h om epa ge: w ww.elsev ier .com/ locate / jebo
ompliance  and  the  power  of  authority
lexandros  Karakostasa,∗∗, Daniel  John  Zizzob,∗
University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, Germany
Newcastle University, United Kingdom
 r  t  i c  l  e  i  n  f  o
rticle history:
eceived 9 June 2014
eceived in revised form
8 September 2015
ccepted 21 September 2015
vailable online 1 October 2015
EL classiﬁcation:
72
91
03
12
8
eywords:
ompliance
bedience
onformism
ocial pressure
xperimenter demand
ntisocial behavior
a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Compliance  to  authority  is an integral  part  of how  organizations  operate.  We  use  an  experi-
ment  to show  that  compliance  to  a cue by  an  authority  is  a powerful  motivating  mechanism.
We do this  in  an experiment  where  there  are  direct  orders  or  indirect  cues  to destroy  half
of another  participant’s  earnings  at a  cost  to one’s  own  earnings.  Depending  on the  exper-
imental treatment,  up  to around  60–70%  of participants  decide  to comply  with  the  orders
or  cues  being  provided.
©  2015  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Within the scope of the contract, the relation between employer and employee is no longer a market relation but an
authority relation.
(Arrow, 1974:64)
. Introduction
Kenneth Arrow (1974) argued that the most prevalent characteristic of organizations of any size is the relationship of
uthority and that this, along with compliance to authority, is an integral part of the mechanism by which organizations
unction. Organizational psychologists such as Cialdini and Goldstein (2004, p. 596) claimed that “most organizations would
ease to operate efﬁciently if deference to authority were not one of the prevailing norms.” In social psychology, the paradig-
atic case is provided by Milgram’s (1963, 1974) series of psychology experiments on authority. In these studies the subjects,
or the sake of science, were requested to press a button supposedly to implement an escalating series of electricity shocks
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E1  4SE, United Kingdom. Tel.: +44 191 2085844.
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to a confederate every time the latter provided a wrong answer. The results were surprising, as up to 62.5% of the subjects
continued up to the maximum 450 volts electric shock.1 These studies involved deception and a strong authority presence
who provided progressively stronger verbal cues as the experiment progressed. In economics, authority has been examined
in terms of decision rights and asymmetric information (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Aghion and Tirole,
1997). Yet, the psychological effect of authority on economic interactions has been largely disregarded.
A few recent experimental studies have hinted at the potential importance of the psychological effect of authority for
tax compliance. Silverman et al. (2014) presented a public good experiment where subjects were requested, and later on
reinforced with appeal to the expertise of different authorities,2 to contribute the socially optimal level. An explanation for
why subjects should behave prosocially tended to be effective when combined with the threat of punishment (Silverman
et al., 2014).3 Similarly, Cadsby et al. (2006) have shown that many people pay taxes because they are inclined to obey
authority despite the ﬁnancial attraction of non-compliance. Cadsby et al. (2006) comes closest to our experiment by requir-
ing subjects to pay a cost. However, their design is set in a prosocial context4 and in their manipulation subjects were not
simply requested but also expected to act in line with the request of the experimenter’s authority.5 In an organizational
frame, Robin et al. (2012) found that workers are willing to change their opinions in order to comply with those of their
managers.
We deﬁne compliance to authority as a willingness to permit one’s behavior to be determined by the experimenter.6 We
present a simple experiment on the role of compliance towards an authority, the experimenter, in an experiment where
compliance damages other people’s earnings at a small own  monetary cost. In our experiment we examine how (in)direct
cues for compliance affect participants’ willingness to comply. Additionally, we examine the implications of these cues
being: (un)justiﬁed, in the form of an order, or provided at speciﬁc intervals in time, affect participants’ compliance. In that
sense our experiment also serves as an experimental study on ‘nudging’ (see Thaler and Sunstein, 2008) and particularly
how different nudges affect participants’ compliance to requests by an authority. There is signiﬁcant experimental evidence
which suggests that some people pay taxes because they are intrinsically motivated to pay taxes or more generally to obey
the law (see, e.g., Feld and Frey, 2002 or Alm and Torgler, 2006). In these studies paying tax is framed as a moral obligation. In
our design there are neither prosocial incentives towards the other participants (as in Silverman et al., 2014), nor monetary
incentives for compliance with the authority (as in Robin et al., 2012). This allows us to focus on whether participants have
a drive to comply with an authority, even when there are no monetary beneﬁts (or the risk of sanctions) for him or his
peers from doing so. This enables us to shed more light on whether a norm for compliance exists and if so how it inﬂuences
behavior. In this respect, the choice of an antisocial domain for the action to be undertaken by the agent is especially useful to
control for potential explanations of changes in behavior based on social norms to be prosocial (e.g., Bicchieri, 2006; Keizer
et al., 2008; Bicchieri and Xiao, 2009).7 Within a tax context, this is in turn relevant to identify possible strategies to increase
tax payment, for example based on advertising campaigns.
A laboratory experiment is particularly useful to understand whether there is such a thing as deference to authority
and why it exists, i.e., to identify the underlying preferences and mechanisms that would be difﬁcult to isolate with non-
laboratory data. For example, outside the laboratory, there are often long term relationships between an authority and the
subordinate. In the workplace, for instance, it is difﬁcult to cleanly identify whether and why there is deference to authority
as opposed to simply behaving in a way that satisﬁes one’s own long-term reputational self-interest. There is a natural way
to implement authority in the laboratory, and that is by exploiting the authority of the experimenter: subjects view the
experimenter as being in a position of authority due to its legitimacy and expertise about the experimental environment
(Orne, 1962; Rosnow and Rosenthal, 1997; Zizzo, 2010). Similarly to Cadsby et al. (2006) and Silverman et al. (2014), we use
experimenter demand as our tool to study compliance.8We  wish to address the following questions in this paper. Can vertical, i.e., hierarchical, social pressure by an authority
induce compliance? What if there is no ﬁnancial incentive for complying, the action to be undertaken by the agent is antisocial
(that is, contrary to the standard social norm of not damaging others), and the nudge is much weaker than in Milgram’s
1 Similar results have been found under a range of variants and of subject pools (e.g., Kilham and Mann, 1974; Shanab and Yahya, 1977, 1978; Meeus
and  Raaijmakers, 1995; Blass, 1999). See Reicher et al. (2012) for a recent review and reinterpretation of the experimental psychology literature.
2 Initially there is an explicit request, later on reinforced with a justiﬁcation provided by four graduate students, or four members of faculty.
3 Arrow (1974) also argued that the main role for sanctions is to facilitate authority, an argument strongly supported by the ﬁndings by Silverman et al.
(2014).
4 For reasons explained below, we preferred an antisocial context, as it allows us to eliminate potential confounds.
5 Subjects were given an explicit reason to give, which was to help fund future experiments.
6 Our deﬁnition of authority is very similar to Simon’s (1979) who  deﬁned obedience to authority as “a willingness to permit one’s behavior to be
determined by the employer” (Simon, 1979:502). Similarly to Arrow (1974), Simon (1946, 1979) also argued that obedience to authority is a prevailing
norm  within organizations.
7 Hence, our choice for an antisocial domain is methodological: we  wanted to eliminate compliance driven by a motive to be nice towards peers (i.e.,
the  other participants). Nevertheless, there are cases in the real world where subordinates need to take unpleasant or nasty decisions driven by requests
from  a higher authority. Two examples include mid-level managers who  need to reduce personnel, or alternatively relocate staff to shared ofﬁces, under a
directive from a high-level manager.
8 Providing the role of authority to the experimenter is a considerably more valid experimental test of the role of the authority in the laboratory than
would, say, providing the role of authority to an experimental subject; the latter would make the experiment one where any effect of authority would be
inexorably confounded with one of peer pressure, rather than enabling to identify the effect of authority.
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xperiments? And if so, does providing a justiﬁcation for acting antisocially matters, and can we induce greater compliance
y requesting to comply on speciﬁc intervals in time?
Overall, our results suggest that greater attention on the psychological effect of authority should be given in principal-
gent modeling and more generally in thinking about incentives and delegation in public and private organizations. We
nd that an indirect nudge to comply with our request to destroy half of another’s participant earnings does not make any
tatistical difference when compared to a treatment that no cue is provided. However, when indirect pressure is reinforced
y an explicit request in the instructions to reduce their partners’ income in the form of a polite request with respect to the
ction being ‘useful’, even if there is no explicit reason provided for the usefulness, the destruction rates more than doubles.
f the request is phrased as an order, the increase is not as large. Asking subjects to destroy in speciﬁc intervals in time
ncreases destruction rates further, a result robust to providing an explicit justiﬁcation for destruction. Additionally, we ﬁnd
hat subjects are willing to destroy half of their partners’ earnings from the experiment even if their partner is unable to
estroy their own earnings (i.e., destruction due to the potential for reciprocal aggression is ruled out), and beliefs about
artner behavior can only partly explain compliance to authority.
Obviously, the way that we frame our request may  matter, and further research needs to look beyond what we are able
o do in this paper. Similarly, while we follow Milgram in treating the experimenter as the authority, there is an obvious
uestion of how generalizable this is, which is also left for future research.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 considers some further related literature. Section 3 pro-
ides the experimental design and research hypotheses. Section 4 presents the results, and Section 5 the discussion and
onclusions.
. Further related literature
Principal-agent models are the standard conceptual framework by which economists consider authority, but their focus
as been on analyzing the effect of different pay structures on decision making by agents. While many experiments have
tudied the impact of social preferences on employment contracts (e.g., Anderhub et al., 2002; Fehr et al., 2007; Karakostas
t al., 2013), consideration has not been given to how authority per se may  help induce compliance to the employer’s expected
ffort; and, while one can have experiments in which the principal suggests effort (as in Güth et al., 2001), students are likely
o see other students as peers rather than authorities. There has been considerable attention in economics to conformism
nd social norms, by which subjects tend to do what a number of others do (e.g., Asch, 1955; Jones, 1984; Lopez-Perez, 2008;
afar, 2011), and there is an important empirical literature on peer effects (e.g., Case and Katz, 1991; Kawaguchi, 2004;
owell et al., 2005; Lundborg, 2006) and on social image and prosocial behavior (e.g., Glazer and Konrad, 1996; Benabou
nd Tirole, 2006; Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009; Ariely et al., 2009), but the focus of this research has been on what we
ay  label as horizontal social pressure, i.e., pressure by peers.9 There has also been some insightful attention to the study of
eadership as a way of helping to solve social dilemmas or weakest link type coordination problems (Moxnes and van der
eijden, 2003; Brandts et al., 2007; Güth et al., 2007; Van der Heijden et al., 2008), but the leaders in this literature are just
eers whose actions may  facilitate cooperation and contribution within groups.
There are a number of other connected strands of research. One is about experimenter demand characteristics by which
 number of experiments are criticized on the grounds that experimental subjects may  change their behavior due to implicit
ues about what constitutes appropriate behavior (Orne, 1962; Rosnow and Rosenthal, 1997; Zizzo, 2010; Zizzo and Fleming,
011). Other related literature is where information is provided on others’ behavior, e.g., in the context of giving (Cason and
ui, 1998; Frey and Meier, 2004; Landry et al., 2006; Krupka and Weber, 2009; Shang and Croson, 2009; Bicchieri and Xiao,
009) or of public good contribution (Bardsley and Sausgruber, 2005), or where there are exogenous recommendations
iven in contexts where it can serve one’s own self-interest, such as threshold public good games (Croson and Marks, 2001),
ournot markets (Sonntag and Zizzo, 2015) or as a device to solve coordination in Chicken games (Cason and Sharma, 2007;
uffy and Feltovich, 2008; Bone et al., 2012) or to improve effort in gift exchange games (Thöni and Gächter, 2012).
Counter to the usual emphasis of behavioral economists on cooperation, there is a small but growing body of research on
ntisocial behavior to which this paper is also related to.10 This research ﬁnds that there are conditions under which subjects
re willing to pay money to damage other’s earnings, even at a cost to their own  (for examples, see Zizzo and Oswald, 2001;
izzo, 2003; Abbink and Sadrieh, 2009; Abbink and Herrmann, 2011; Abbink et al., 2010; Engel and Zhurakhovska, 2012).11here are also conditions in which ‘antisocial’ punishment takes place (Nikiforakis, 2008; Nikiforakis and Engelmann, 2008;
errmann et al., 2008; Denant-Boemont et al., 2007).
9 The difﬁculties with identiﬁcation in peer effects estimations imply that this is an area where experimental research is especially useful (e.g., Manski,
993). In psychology, the connection is with traditional research on the value of conformism to peers (e.g., Asch, 1955) and on inﬂuence (e.g., Cialdini and
oldstein, 2004).
10 Herrmann and Orzen (2008) refer to this as homo rivalis behavior.
11 Abbink and Herrmann’s (2011) idea that subjects are more willing to engage in antisocial behavior if the moral cost of it is lower has some parallelism
ith  the ‘moral wriggle room’ literature (e.g., Dana et al., 2007).
70 A. Karakostas, D.J. Zizzo / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 124 (2016) 67–80Fig. 1. Experimental design. Notes. Each box represents an experimental treatment. R stands for Repeated, RC for Repeated Compliance, RCC for Repeated
Compliance Constant pressure, RC-1 for Repeated Compliance 1-sided and RCJ for Repeated Compliance Justiﬁed.
3. Experimental design and hypotheses
3.1. Outline
The experiment was conducted at the University of East Anglia between January and March 2012 with 390 subjects.
The participants were mostly undergraduate students (79%) while the remainder were postgraduate students. There were
participants from 36 different nationalities while the majority of the subjects were British (54%). The mean age was 22 years
old and 14.62% of the participants were economics students.12 The experiment was in paper and pencil.13 The instructions
were as close as possible to those of Abbink and Herrmann (2011). The experiment employed a ﬁctional currency, called
Guilders, which was converted to pounds at the end of the experiment at the rate of £0.75 per Guilder. Each session lasted
approximately 60 min  and the subjects earned on average £8.14 (approximately 12.38 US dollars), including a show-up fee of
£2.00. Earnings were paid privately and anonymously at the end of the experiment. Subjects were not allowed to participate
in more than one session. The experiment consisted of eight treatments (see Fig. 1), described below: Open (O), Hidden
(H), Repeated question (R), Repeated Order (R-Order), Repeated Compliance Constant pressure (RCC), Repeated Compliance
(RO), Repeated Compliance Justiﬁed (RCJ), and Repeated Compliance 1-sided (RC-1). We  ran 20 sessions in total.14
3.2. The Open and Hidden treatments (O and H)
We  began with a straightforward replication of Abbink and Herrmann’s (2011) two treatments (O and H). The O treat-
ment employs the Joy of Destruction game in which two players were endowed with 10 Guilders each, and both players
simultaneously decided whether or not to destroy 5 Guilders of the other player’s endowment, at an own cost of 1 Guilder. If
they both reduced their partners’ income, they both earned 4 Guilders. If one reduced his/her partner’s income but the other
did not, the ﬁrst earned 9 Guilders and the second earned 5 Guilders (and vice versa). If no one reduced the other person’s
income they both earned 10 Guilders.
In the H treatment, a die was also rolled for each player. If it turned out 1 or 6 (1/3 probability) the player would lose 5
Guilders regardless of the other player’s decision; if the die turned out 2, 3, 4, or 5 (2/3 probability) the partner’s decision
was implemented. A player who lost 5 Guilders was not told whether this was due to the partner’s action, or because of the
roll of the die. Abbink and Herrmann (2011) predicted that in the H treatment the destruction rate would be higher than in
the O treatment, as the moral costs of nastiness would be decreased by the player being able to hide behind the possibility of
destruction by nature and being able to reason that, had the player not destroyed, destruction may  have occurred anyway.
12 We controlled for economic students in our regression analysis but we did not ﬁnd it to have a statistically signiﬁcant impact.
13 We decided to run this experiment in paper and pencil deliberately in order to be as close as possible to the design of Abbink and Herrmann (2011).
14 We aimed for (at least) 40 independent observations per treatment, which meant 40 subjects for the O, H, R and R-Order treatments, and 80 subjects
for  the RC-1 treatment (since, as discussed later, only half of the RC-1 subjects made actual destruction decisions); as we were able to have a few more
subjects, we had 56 subjects for the RC treatment and 54 for the RCC treatment.
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Following Abbink and Herrmann (2011), after subjects had decided if they want to reduce their partner’s income or not,
e used an incentivized questionnaire in which we  asked the participants about their beliefs of their partner’s behavior (i.e.,
heir choice whether to destroy or not). If their prediction was correct they were rewarded with 1 Guilder.
After the incentivized questionnaire and before subjects were informed about their earnings we requested them to
omplete two questionnaires. The ﬁrst was a social desirability scale questionnaire (Stöber, 2001) and the second collected
emographic information.
.3. The Repeated question treatment (R)
The Repeated question treatment (R) was identical to the O treatment except for the following: the subjects were informed
hat the experiment consists of a predetermined amount of rounds. Rounds in our experiment implied that in case they decided
ot to destroy we would ask them up to 10 times if they wanted to change their decision. The participants were not informed
bout the number of rounds, or times they were going to be asked, but only that there was  a predetermined amount. If a
articipant chose to destroy, the game ended. There were up to ten rounds.
More speciﬁcally, at the start of the ﬁrst round the subjects were asked if they wanted to reduce their partner’s income
t the cost of 1 Guilder. After all subjects made their choices, the experimenters record their choices in a separate sheet of
aper. If they decided to reduce their partner’s income, they did not make any further decision within the game, i.e., in the
emainder of the 10 rounds. If they decided not to reduce their partner’s income, in the following round they were asked if
hey were sure that they did not want to change their choice (i.e., reduce their partner’s income). This question was posed
o the subjects until they either changed their choice or until the experiment reached the ﬁnal round. No feedback on their
hoices was provided to, or received about the actions of their partners, in between rounds.
Note that subjects could only destroy once throughout the game; once they chose to destroy, the game was effectively
ompleted as far as they were concerned and they would have to wait.15
The aim of this treatment was to test for the effect of an indirect request or nudge. If this has any effect, it can be expected
o be in the direction of increasing destruction. This is because it may  start implicitly to build up on the pressure to destroy
y repeating the question ten times.
ypothesis 1. A higher destruction rate is expected in the R treatment than in the O treatment.
.4. Repeated Compliance Constant pressure (RCC)
The Repeated Compliance Constant pressure treatment (RCC) extends the R treatment. At the end of the instructions
he following sentence was added “it would be especially useful [to the experimenter] if you were to reduce your partner’s
ncome if you have not done so already. You are entirely free not to reduce if you wish”.16 This is our ﬁrst direct pressure
reatment where we explicitly request participants to destroy their partner’s income.
This was the ﬁrst subtle yet explicit cue from the experimenter to the subject to destroy. It was  deliberately a subtle cue
or three reasons. First, in many real world settings commands are phrased in similar equivalent subtle language, and we
anted our experiment to be applicable to more than contexts where a direct command is given.
Unlike Milgram (1963, 1974) or Cadsby et al. (2006), we did not provide an explicit reason to destroy in this treatment,
hough our instructions focused subjects on destroying as being particularly useful towards the experimenter without
roviding a justiﬁcation.
We expect subjects to destroy more in the experiment as a result of the experimental authority cue being provided, and
o in this treatment more than in the R treatment. This is because the cue makes both clear and stronger the demand from
he authority to destroy.ypothesis 2. A higher destruction rate is expected in the RCC treatment than in the R treatment.
15 We asked subjects whether they would have been willing to reduce their partners’ income for an additional 5 Guilders at the cost of 1 Guilder, but this
as  a purely hypothetical and unincentivized question. See the online appendix for a brief analysis of the hypothetical responses.
16 The wording in the square brackets was  not included in the instructions, as it seemed obvious to us at the time that the beneﬁt could only be towards
he  experimenter. Participants were fully informed of all stages of the experiment at the start and it was  clear that their sole decision was to either destroy
alf  of their partner income at an own monetary cost or not. Consequently, it was clear that there was no way it could beneﬁt the participant. We chose
recisely not to explain in what terms that would be useful to the experimenter as in a follow-up treatment we explicitly provide a justiﬁcation for that
equest. This allows us later on to compare how providing a justiﬁcation for compliance affects behavior. In terms of procedures, after the instructions
ere read aloud participants were given the option to ask clariﬁcation questions. In the rare case a participant would ask to whom it would be useful, it
as  clariﬁed that it could not be useful to them or to any of the other participants. Lastly, as part of the end of experiment questionnaires, we added an
pen  ended question, in which we asked the subjects what they believed was the scientiﬁc objective of the experiment. This question was provided in all
he  following treatments as well. As discussed later on no participant pointed that did not understand to whom usefulness were referred to. Nor did we
ave  any complaints from participants that they found the phrasing misleading.
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3.5. Repeated Order (R-Order)
The Repeated Order treatment extends the R treatment to evaluate to what extend an explicit order, rather than a polite
nudge as in RCC, affects compliance rates. In this treatment the participants were told: “We  as experimenters give you the
order now to reduce your partners’ income. You now decide whether to obey to this order.” This should increase compliance
relative to the R treatment, but the effect relative to the RCC treatment is less clear. On the one side, a direct order can be
expected to be more effective in obtaining obedience from subjects; on the other hand, the direct and less polite nature of
the request may  make it sound less reasonable, making compliance lower.17
Hypothesis 3. A higher destruction rate is expected in the R-Order treatment than in the R treatment.
3.6. Repeated Compliance (RC)
The Repeated Compliance (RC) treatment extends the RCC treatment. In this treatment, rounds 1, 4, 7 and 10 were
marked with decision sheets provided on yellow paper. In this treatment the participant were told: “in the rounds with
yellow instructions it would be especially useful if you were to reduce your partner’s income if you have not done so already.
You are entirely free not to reduce if you wish.”
We expect that the ‘yellow rounds’ may  be particularly effective in raising destruction. This is because, ﬁrst, it is consistent
with research on adaptive utility (e.g., Robson, 2001, for a discussion) showing how subjects are less likely to react with
constant stimuli than they are with only occasional stimuli. Constant stimuli lead to adaptation and therefore ignoring, while
intermittent signals are more likely to elicit a response.18 Second, the ‘yellow rounds’ make more transparent and stronger
what the experimenter demands in the rounds with peak pressure, while still allowing as many as four opportunities to
destroy given our experimental setup.
Hypothesis 4. A higher destruction rate is expected in the RC treatment than in the RCC treatment.
Hypothesis 5. A higher destruction rate is expected in the RC treatment than in the R treatment.
3.7. Repeated Compliance Justiﬁed (RCJ)
The Repeated Compliance Justiﬁed treatment (RCJ) differs from the RC treatment in that, in addition to the same cue as in
the RC treatment, participants are told that reducing their partner’s income “would help us achieve a scientiﬁc objective of
the experiment”. Providing an explicit reason for destruction should increase destruction by increasing the moral legitimacy
or providing an excuse to be nasty, either way therefore increasing further the compliance of participants to the authority
(and/or increasing the likelihood of anticipated reciprocity).
Hypothesis 6. A higher destruction rate is expected in the RCJ treatment than in the RC treatment.
We assume that increasing pressure across treatments would lead to a cumulative effect on participants’ compliance.
Hence, given that we expect higher destruction in RC than RCC and a higher destruction in RCC than R, we also expect
destruction to be higher in RCJ than in the R treatment.
Hypothesis 7. A higher destruction rate is expected in the RCJ treatment than in the R treatment.
3.8. Repeated Compliance 1-sided (RC-1)
The Repeated Compliance 1-sided treatment (RC-1) differs from the RC treatment in that half of the subjects were active
and half were passive (though this terminology was not used in the instructions). Each active subject was matched with a
passive partner but only the active subject made destruction decisions within the game, and this was common knowledge.
Speciﬁcally, active subjects were told that “your partner answers some hypothetical questions but makes no decisions
affecting your or his or her earnings”.
The RC-1 treatment tests whether the cue by the authority induces destruction because of anticipated reciprocity. If
destruction is entirely driven by an unconditional desire to comply there is no reason to expect that the destruction rates in
RC-1 will differ from the destruction rates in RC. If however destruction is motivated by some anticipated reciprocity from
partner’s behavior, then the fact the partner can no longer affect the participant’s earnings should lead to lower compliance
and consequently destruction rates. We  expect that at least some participants would be motivated by anticipated reciprocity
and/or from a desire to ensure they will not receive a lower payoff than their partner leading to lower destruction rates on
average in the RC-1 treatment than in the RC.
Hypothesis 8. A higher destruction rate is expected in the RC treatment than in the RC-1 treatment.
17 See Pelligra et al. (2015) for an experiment showing how the perceived reasonableness of requests made by the experimenter on how much the trustee
should return matters in the context of return rates in the context of trust games.
18 As an example, this can be seen as a reason why  alarms often have intermittent rather than constant beeping.
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Fig. 2. Destruction rates across treatments. Notes. Yellow stands for treatments with ‘yellow rounds’ RC, RCJ and RC-1. Non-Yellow stands for treatments
R  and RCC. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Table 1
Regressions on destruction rates.
Variables Regression 1 Regression 2
dy/dx p dy/dx p
O −0.161 (0.119) 0.177 −0.190 (0.048) 0.111
H  −0.032 (0.107) 0.762 −0.048 (0.053) 0.652
RCC  0.238*** (0.090) 0.008 0.233*** (0.084) 0.009
R-Order 0.131 (0.099) 0.187 0.090 (0.075) 0.367
RC  0.370**** (0.085) 0.000 0.364**** (0.083) 0.000
RCJ  0.465**** (0.090) 0.000 0.440**** (0.083) 0.000
RC-1  0.378**** (0.092) 0.000 0.370**** (0.075) 0.000
British −0.097** (0.064) 0.044
Gender 0.051 (0.049) 0.281
Age  −0.003 (0.006) 0.566
Economics −0.071 (0.067) 0.276
Atheist −0.054 (0.088) 0.249
N  350 350
Pseudo R2 0.159 0.176
Prob  > X2 0.000 0.000
Notes: Marginal effects of Probit regressions with robust standard errors.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
O
n
t
4
4
w
t
W**** p < 0.001.
ther than treatment variables, regressions include age (subtracted from mean age), gender (= 1 for women), economics background (= 1 if applicable),
ationality (British = 1 for British subjects, Atheist = 1 for atheist and agnostic subjects).
As no anticipatory retaliation was possible in this treatment, there was  no question regarding expected destruction from
he partner at the end of the experiment.
. Results
.1. Testing the hypothesesFig. 2 presents the average destruction rate across treatments. Table 1 presents the results of Probit regressions on
hether subjects choose to destroy (= 1) or not (= 0) and their implications in terms of overall winning probabilities for each
reatment. The regressions employ dummy  variables for the experimental treatments; the R treatment was  used as baseline.
e included dummies for British nationality, gender, age economics students and atheist as controls. Table 2 reports Wald
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Table 2
Wald tests on coefﬁcients of regressions on destruction rates.
Wald tests (p-values)
Regression 1 Regression 2
Open = Hidden 0.291 0.239
R-Order = RCC 0.212 0.097
RC  = RCC 0.087 0.089
RC  = R-Order 0.005 0.002
RC  = RC-1 0.916 0.937
RC  = RCJ 0.266 0.370
tests of equality of coefﬁcients for our treatment variables. The result supports the interpretation of destruction as compliance
to the authority, whereas the demographic variables are generally insigniﬁcant. We  now consider the hypotheses and the
key evidence.
Result 1. Against Hypothesis 1, there is no statistically signiﬁcant difference between destruction rates in the H, O and
the R treatments.
Evidence.  Destruction in R treatment is roughly the same as those in the H treatment and both are qualitatively above
O, which is what we would expect and descriptively in line with the results of Abbink and Herrmann (2011). The regression
coefﬁcient on O is not statistically signiﬁcant for either regression 1 (p = 0.18) or 2 (p = 0.11). The same results can be obtained
in a simple bivariate test by comparing destruction rate proportions in the Open and Hidden treatments using a Fisher’s
exact test (p = 0.24) or between the Open and R (p = 0.31) treatments.19 Overall, repeating the question again and again does
not make a signiﬁcant difference, with the destruction rate remaining below 20%.
Result 2. In support of Hypothesis 2, the destruction rate is statistically signiﬁcantly higher in the RCC treatment than in
the R treatment. The difference is large.
Evidence.  Fig. 2 shows how the RCC destruction rates are more than double than that in the R treatment. A bivariate
Fisher’s exact test is signiﬁcant (p = 0.01). The same is true for our regression coefﬁcients which are positive and highly
statistically signiﬁcant (p < 0.01).
Result 3. In contrast to Hypothesis 3, the destruction rate is not statistically signiﬁcant different between the R and the
R-Order treatment.
Evidence.  Fig. 2 shows that the destruction rate in the R-Order is between the R and RCC treatments. A bivariate Fisher’s
exact test between the R and the R-Order values is not statistically signiﬁcant (p = 0.29). The regression coefﬁcients are not
statistically signiﬁcant in neither regression 1 (p = 0.19) nor in regression 2 (p = 0.37).
That said, the R-Order destruction rate is also not statistically signiﬁcant from that in the RCC treatment using a Fisher’s
exact test (p = 0.28) or in regression 1 (Wald test, p = 0.21), while being marginally signiﬁcant in regression 2 (p = 0.097).
Result 4. In support of Hypothesis 4, the destruction rate is weakly statistically signiﬁcantly higher in the RC treatment
than in the RCC treatment.
Evidence.  As shown by Fig. 2, quantitatively, the destruction rate in RC is about 16% more than in RCC, suggesting that
providing peak pressure at intervals makes a difference. A bivariate Fisher’s exact test yields a weak statistical signiﬁcance in
a one-sided test (p = 0.06). Conducting Wald tests between RCC and RC suggest a weak statistical signiﬁcant difference in both
regression 1 (p = 0.087) and regression 2 (p = 0.089).20 The supplementary analysis of Section 4.2 provides complementary
evidence.
Result 5. In support of Hypothesis 5, the destruction rate is statistically signiﬁcantly higher in the RC treatment than in
the R treatment. The difference is large.
Evidence.  Fig. 2 shows how the destruction rate more than triples when moving from the R treatment (17.5%) to the RC
treatment (58.9%), suggesting a cumulating effect between cue and peak pressure. This is signiﬁcant in a bivariate Fisher’s
exact test (p < 0.001) and in the regression analysis. The estimated coefﬁcients on RC are positive and statistically signiﬁcant
in both regression 1 (p < 0.001) and regression 2 (p < 0.001).
Result 6. Against Hypothesis 6, there is no statistically signiﬁcant difference between destruction rates in the RC and the
RCJ treatments.
Evidence.  While the destruction rate is as high as 70% in the RCJ treatment, the difference from the RC treatment is not
enough to achieve statistical signiﬁcance either in a bivariate Fisher’s exact test (p = 0.29) or in the Wald tests (p = 0.216 in
regression 1 and p = 0.37 in regression 2). Providing an explicit reason for destruction does not seem to make a difference.
Result 7. In support of Hypothesis 7, the destruction rate is statistically signiﬁcantly higher in the RCJ treatment than in
the R treatment. The difference is large.
19 All p-values reported in this paper are two tailed unless speciﬁed otherwise.
20 Note that the evidence is stronger when comparing RCC with R-Order. For example, Wald tests between the relevant coefﬁcients result in p = 0.005 for
regression 1 and p = 0.002 for regression 2.
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Fig. 3. Destruction rates per round. Notes. Yellow stands for treatments with ‘yellow rounds’ RC, RCJ and RC-1. Non-Yellow stands for treatments R, RCC
and  R-Order. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web  version of this article.)
Table 3
Destruction rates in each round.
Round R R-Order RCC RC RCJ RC-1
1 5.00% 17.5% 22.50% 25.00% 37.50% 25.00%
2  2.63% 6.06% 16.13% 9.52% 16.00% 6.67%
3  5.40% 3.22% 11.53% 10.52% 14.28% 14.29%
4  0.00% 3.22% 17.39% 20.58% 27.78% 25.00%
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totes: The destruction rate in round 1 is the proportion of all subjects who  have destroyed in round 1. The destruction rates for rounds 2, 3 and 4
re  conditional on the destruction in the previous rounds: speciﬁcally, they are the proportions of all subjects who have destroyed in the given round
onditional on them not having destroyed in the previous round(s).
Evidence.  The destruction rate is four times as high in the RCJ treatment as in the R treatment. It should then come to no
urprise that this difference is statistically signiﬁcant in a bivariate Fisher’s exact test (p < 0.001) or in the regression analysis,
here the estimated coefﬁcients for the RCJ dummy  yield p < 0.001 for both regressions 1 and 2.
Result 8. Against Hypothesis 8, there is no statistically signiﬁcant difference between destruction rates in the RC and the
C-1 treatments.
Evidence.  Fig. 2 already provides the answer by showing virtually identical destruction rates (60% in RC-1 vs 58.9% in
C), not statistically signiﬁcantly different in a bivariate Fisher’s exact test (p = 1.00). The Wald tests between the RC and
C-1 dummy  in regressions 1 (p = 0.916) and 2 (p = 0.937) further conﬁrm this. Overall, this points to compliance to authority
ather than anticipated reciprocity by partners as the driver of destruction.21
.2. Supplementary analysis
Time of destruction.  It is interesting to see when the decision to destroy takes place over the ten rounds of most treatments
i.e., all treatments other than O and H). Fig. 3 presents destruction rates per round for the ‘yellow rounds’ repeated play
reatments where peak pressure is applied to destroy at given points in time (RC, RCJ, and RC-1) and for treatments where
onstant pressure was applied (R, RCC and R-Order). Note that subjects can only destroy once, and therefore those who
ave already destroyed in the early rounds cannot destroy further in the following rounds; effectively, later decisions are
onditional on not having destroyed before, reﬂecting a sample selection increasingly composed of subjects who are less
illing to comply with the experimental cue provided.
Fig. 3 shows that almost all of the destruction takes places by the 4th round, and Table 3 provides a breakdown of
estruction rates (conditional on the previous round’s destruction from round 2 onwards) up to round 4. Despite the declining
21 It is interesting to compare and contrast our simple between treatments test on anticipation of reciprocity with the use of belief elicitation data, which
e  also collected at the end of the experiment for all treatments other than RC-1 (where it obviously could not be formulated). There tends to be a positive
orrelation between destruction and stated belief about the destruction of the other partner, though there is no clear pattern to it across treatments and it
ay  be largely driven by noise (Spearman  = 0.854, −0.009, 0.223, −0.126, 0.297, 0.480, 0.180, respectively with p < 0.001, p = 0.96, 0.17, 0.03, 0.44, <0.01,
nd  = 0.195 in treatments O, H, R, R-Order, RC, RCJ and RCC respectively). It is possible that having decided to destroy might make it more likely for subjects
o  believe the partner will, e.g., out of self-image and cognitive dissonance concerns.
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Fig. 4. Beliefs on destruction rates accross treatments. Notes. Yellow stands for treatments with ‘yellow rounds’ RC, RCJ and RC-1. Non-Yellow stands for
treatments R and RCC. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Table 4
Regressions on destruction rates with beliefs.
Variables Regression 3 Regression 4
dy/dx p dy/dx p
Open −0.168 (0.105) 0.107 −0.187* (0.105) 0.074
Hidden −0.038 (0.102) 0.707 −0.051 (0.062) 0.612
RCC  0.189** (0.085) 0.026 0.187** (0.079) 0.026
R-Order 0.099 (0.095) 0.296 0.075 (0.075) 0.432
RC  0.276 (0.082) 0.001 0.277*** (0.072) 0.001
RCJ  0.403**** (0.083) 0.000 0.391**** (0.050) 0.000
Beliefs 0.196**** (0.008) 0.000
British −0.066 (0.064) 0.175
Gender 0.023 (0.051) 0.631
Age  −0.003 (0.006) 0.619
Economics −0.061 (0.070) 0.380
Atheist −0.030 (0.096) 0.536
N  310 310
Pseudo R2 0.203 0.211
Prob  > X2 0.000 0.000
Notes: Marginal effects of Probit regressions with robust standard errors.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
**** p < 0.001.
Other than treatment variables, regressions include age (subtracted from mean age), gender (= 1 for women), economics background (= 1 if applicable),
nationality (British = 1 for British subjects, Atheist = 1 for atheist and agnostic subjects).
trend across rounds due to early decisions to destroy and sample selection, in the ‘yellow rounds’ treatments with peaks in
pressure to destroy there is a spike in destruction rates in round 4. This is in line with our expectations, and complements
Result 4 above, as round 4 was one of the rounds in which we  asked the subjects explicitly to reduce their partners’ income.
In treatments other than O or H, as subjects know that there are multiple rounds, subjects can defer destruction to after
round 1, and many do so.22
Data on beliefs.  Fig. 4 presents the beliefs on average destruction rates by partners across treatments. Table 4 presents the
results of Probit regressions on whether subjects choose to destroy or not including a dummy  for beliefs instead of RC-1.
The ﬁrst observation that can be drawn from Fig. 4 is that on average the subjects expected a lower destruction from
their partners than what was actually observed (Wilcoxon p = 0.02). Nevertheless, beliefs predict the decision to destroy in
both regressions reported in Table 4 (p < 0.001). With respect to changes across treatments, beliefs on destruction between
22 We ran Probit regression analysis speciﬁcally on round 1 destruction (see online appendix). The coefﬁcients on the O and R dummies are negative and
statistically signiﬁcant relative to the RC baseline; that on H is not.
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pig. 5. Proportion of qualitative responses per category for each treatment. Notes. The responses were to a question on what subjects thought was the
bjective of the experiment.
, H and R are similar to each other.23 However, this is not true for R and RCC or RCC and RCJ. In these cases, in line with the
ncrease in destructions rates there is an increase on beliefs on partner’s destruction.24
Qualitative data. As noted earlier, in the treatments with an explicit cue by the authority/experimenter to destroy (RC,
CC, RC-1 and RCJ),25 at the end of the experiment we  asked subjects what they thought the objective of the experiment
as.26 The answers were then grouped in categories by research assistants themselves not informed of the objectives of
he experiment.27 The answers were divided into 7 broad categories: authority/effect of yellow instructions, willingness to
educe the others payoff at an own sacriﬁce, selﬁshness vs cooperation, trust towards peers, attitudes towards social and
trategic interaction, and change in behavior over time, and rest.28 Fig. 5 displays the results of the classiﬁcation.
Unsurprisingly, while between 15% and 30% of the subjects in the treatments with ‘yellow rounds’ peaks of pressure
icked ‘authority/effect of yellow instructions’ as the objective of the experiment, less than 5% did so in the RCC treatment
ith constant pressure and no ‘yellow rounds.’29 The modal answer in RCC switched to ‘selﬁshness/cooperation’, again a
lausible response insofar as subjects can avoid destroying each other.30
There seem to be three useful messages from the qualitative data. First, all of the six substantive categories pick up
n potentially relevant aspects of the decision problem, displaying no evidence of confusion about the decision problem.
econd, we had no evidence, either from these categories or looking at the residual category, of subjects wanting to destroy
oney in order to indirectly return money to the experimenter, which would be a kind of house money effect.31 Third,
23 There is no statistically signiﬁcant difference between O and H or O and R (Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.51 and p = 1 respectively).
24 A weakly statistically signiﬁcant difference is observed between R and RCC and RCC and RCJ (p = 0.078 and p = 0.053 respectively). The difference
etween RC and RCJ is not statistically signiﬁcant (Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.216).
25 The R-Order treatment was conducted later after a suggestion by a referee and we did not collect qualitative data for this treatment.
26 Such data obviously has limitations, as discussed in Zizzo (2010).
27 The answers were ﬁrst grouped into categories by a research assistant with no prior knowledge of the aims of the experiment or experimental design.
fterwards a second research assistant, with no prior knowledge of the aims of the experiment, received the previously created seven categories along with
he  subjects’ responses and was asked to independently match every answer with one of the categories. Finally, the assistants have met  up to reconcile any
iscrepancy. Our procedure follows a tradition of coding in qualitative research (e.g., Saldanˇa, 2012), adapted to eliminate any risk of any research project
elated in the coding of categories; see Bourgheas et al. (2013) for another example within experimental economics.
28 Authority/effect of yellow instructions referred to subjects who  believed that the aim of the experiment was  either the inﬂuence of authority upon them
r  the inﬂuence of the ‘yellow paper’ rounds. Willingness to reduce the others payoff at own sacriﬁce saw the experiment being about subjects reducing their
artner’s income despite there was no monetary incentive for them to do so. Selﬁshness/cooperation referred to whether people are selﬁsh or willing to
ooperate. Similarly, Trust was  about subjects being able to trust each other not to destroy. Attitudes towards social and strategic interaction was  about when
ubjects  argued that the aim of the experiment relates to strategic behavior, either on what the other subject will do or what he or she would do if he or
he  was  in their place (RC-1 treatment). Change in behavior over time answers were about the experiment being about change in choice if they are asked
epetitively if they will change their choice. Rest was the residual category and included non-responders.
29 The difference between the RCC and the remaining treatments is statistically signiﬁcant (Fisher exact tests, p = 0.017, 0.014 and <0.001 for RC, RCJ and
C-1  respectively).
30 This difference is also statistically signiﬁcant across all treatments (Fisher’s exact tests, p = 0.024, 0.007 and 0.07 for RC, RCJ and RC-1 respectively).
31 In support of this negative ﬁnding, in a different experiment by the second author with Piers Fleming, we offer the opportunity to subjects to materially
estroy University cafes coupons by putting them through a shredder, which rules out this house money effect explanation; however, many do when
rovided with a cue in the form of what subjects did in a previous treatment (Fleming and Zizzo, 2015).
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there is no evidence that subjects wanted to be altruistic towards the experimenter as such; the focus even of the answers
classiﬁed as related to ‘selﬁshness/cooperation’ was with respect to partners.
5. Discussion and conclusions
We  found that a norm of compliance exists, independently of any social norm to be prosocial. A limited nudge, without
an explicit justiﬁcation, can induce compliance from 60% of the subjects.32 Our 60% destruction rate compares with previous
experiments on antisocial behavior that have achieved destruction rates between 10% and 40%.33 While unequivocal, our
cue was not phrased directly; indirect cues of this kind are arguably pervasive in both private and public organizations.34
Phrasing the cue as a direct order was instead not particularly helpful. We  conjecture that, in this case, the impoliteness and
evident arbitrariness of the requests compensated for any additional effectiveness deriving from the directness of the cue.35
Clearly, more research on different formulations, and the norms that these different formulations appeal to, would be an
interesting area for further research and relevant for public policy. Additionally, in a taxation context, it may  be relevant to
identify the most effective nudges (for example, in the form of advertising) to elicit tax compliance.
In the real world, employees may  be compliant because there are clear monetary beneﬁts from doing so (see Robin et al.,
2012). However, the fact that participants had no monetary incentives to be compliant (but rather the opposite) in this
experiment, is consistent with the existence of a norm of compliance. The verb ‘useful’ employed in most treatments may
have suggested to subjects that there was some value for the experimenter from destroying. It does not explain however
why the subjects should do something of value for the experimenter when they are equally told that they are free to do
whatever they like.36 This is where the adherence to a norm to comply towards the (trusted) authority comes in.
Our results cannot be explained by purely repeating the question again and again, since by doing so destruction rates
remained below 20%. They also cannot be explained by reciprocal expectations of destruction from the partner, since, even
in the absence of the possibility of reciprocity, we observe around a 60% destruction rate. Providing pressure at peak intervals
does help the authority to induce more compliance. In a tax context, one could think of adverts encouraging tax compliance
say in the month before the ofﬁcial deadline.
Arrow (1974) argued that compliance to authority, whether this is the authority of law or to a superior in an organization,
is due to expectations that others will also comply. This is an important idea both for public policy and for the management
of organizations. Our data on beliefs provides some support to this hypothesis. On average participants expected signiﬁ-
cantly fewer people to comply than the amount observed, but we  do observe that the greater the pressure to comply more
participants expected others to comply and destruction was higher. Our qualitative data suggests that subjects generally did
understand the nature of the task and that their compliance was  not driven by a desire to return money to the experimenter.
Of course, qualitative data has limitations and should be taken with caution.
A deliberate and explicit experimenter demand (Zizzo, 2010) was used as a tool to study the effect of authority. Providing
the role of an authority to a subject would have been inappropriate as it would have mixed up an effect of authority with
that of peer pressure, preventing the identiﬁcation of the former in isolation. Our choice of the experimenter as the source
of authority is of course the same made by Milgram (1963, 1974). Relative to Milgram (1963, 1974), our study checked how
far one can go with authority when considerably weaker and less explicit cues to obey are employed, and such weaker and
less explicit cues also more in line with the reality of the functioning of authority in the every-day life of organizations.
Overall, our experiment suggests that a norm of compliance towards the authority should not be neglected in principal-
agent modeling, nor should it be neglected as a powerful managerial and policy tool. It is arguable that, even in the lack of
economic incentives, individuals may  tend at least to some degree to comply with requests, though a more direct request
is not necessarily more effective than a less direct request. This is exploited by economic organizations big and small as a
management tool. For example, it may  help strategic delegation which is advantageous to principals in handling conﬂict
and contests (Wärneryd, 2012). As another example, it may  be one reason (complementary to others) why marginal wage
32 It is interesting to note that, in the different context of prosocial behavior ultimately in one’s own self-interest, Silverman et al. (2014) also ﬁnd an
effect  for a cue but not an additional effect for a justiﬁcation, at least when not also combined with the threat of a ﬁnancial penalty, and equally Sonntag
and  Zizzo (2015) do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant aggregate effect of a justiﬁcation.
33 This has been achieved using methods such as the ability to hide due to random destruction (Abbink and Herrmann, 2011; Abbink and Sadrieh, 2009)
or  the introduction of pointless prizes (Abbink and Herrmann, 2009).
34 An indirect cue is also useful within the experimental context to address the potential criticism that subjects may  be destroying simply because they
have  to follow the instructions on what to do in the experiment. This is particularly true as we made simultaneously clear that they were free to do whatever
they  wanted.
35 A reviewer suggested an alternative interpretation: namely, that the 30% destruction rate in the R-Order treatment is our best estimate of a pure
obedience effect. We  feel this may  be inaccurate in both directions. It may  be an over-estimate because destruction effects in the R treatment may be due
to  pure antisocial preferences (as per Abbink and Sadrieh, 2009), and, if so, only the difference in destruction rates between the R and R-Order treatments
(12.5%) could be purely identiﬁed as an obedience effect. It may  also be an under-estimate because the RCC treatment may  also be picking up a pure
obedience effect.
36 One possible response would be that the experimenter is not an anonymous person and subjects may  have a repeated relationship with the lab. This
would be a problem if subjects felt that they had to be afraid of any repercussions if they did not follow our cue. However, as far as we can tell not a single
qualitative comment by any subject reﬂected a fear of this kind. In addition, if such fear were true, it should have been heightened in the R-Order treatment,
leading to more destruction relative to RCC, which is in contrast to our results. The UEA laboratory is well established, with many experiments run each
year,  an established ethical protocol and a clear reputation that what happens in an experiment remains in the experiment.
i
R
a
t
r
n
t
r
a
s
A
W
t
w
u
h
A
j
R
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
C
C
C
C
C
C
D
A
tA. Karakostas, D.J. Zizzo / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 124 (2016) 67–80 79
ncentives are found less in organizations than they should under principal-agent modeling with self-interest (Milgrom and
oberts, 1992). Where authority is in the wrong hands, cues to engage in aggressive or harassing behavior do not have to go
s far as giving explicit orders (the additional effectiveness of which is anyway unclear based on our results). There seems
o be evidence of this in organizations (Ashford and Anand, 2003; Brief et al., 1995; Darley, 2001); a desire to inﬂuence, as
ecently found experimentally by Sadrieh and Schröder (2012), may be the counterpart of the inclination to comply.37
Within a tax context, it is useful to identify how effective a norm of compliance can be when isolated from prosocial
orms that may  also support tax compliance. As noted earlier, this may  inform policies, such as advertising campaigns, that
ry to leverage on such a norm of compliance. The converse of our ﬁnding, of course, is that some 30–40% of subjects were
esistant to the cues by the authority, even when phrased reasonably, repeated ten times, under intervals of peak pressure
nd with an explicit justiﬁcation. If our sample is more broadly representative (which, of course, is a signiﬁcant if), this
uggests that a different type of intervention is likely to be needed to reach out to about 1/3 of taxpayers.
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